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However, recent studies [9–11] have shown that
DCNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples,
specially-crafted by making minute perturbations
to natural images. Such perturbations can cause a
classiﬁer to misclassify an image with high conﬁdence
in the wrong result. Figure 1 shows that an
adversarial example causes misclassiﬁcation of an
SUV as a bus. Clearly, it is important to make deep
convolutional neural networks that are robust in the
face of adversarial attacks.
Previous defenses to adversarial attacks are mainly
of two kinds. The ﬁrst kind trains a detector network
[12–14], which acts as a ﬁlter rejecting malicious
input to the target model. The other kind uses a
defensive model to decrease the eﬀects of adversarial
perturbations and improve the adversarial robustness
of the target model [15–17]. However, Xie et al.
[18] have shown that denoising may aﬀect the performance of the target model on clean images, as
Keywords adversarial defense; adversarial detection; valid information for classiﬁcation may be lost in the
vehicle classiﬁcation; deep learning
denoising process.
In this paper, we propose a new method based
on joint detection and removal of adversarial
1 Introduction
perturbations by denoising (DDAP). Unlike previous
In recent years, deep convolutional neural networks work, our defensive method combines an adversarial
(DCNNs) have been widely used in many diﬀerent perturbation detector and a denoiser, using joint
tasks, such as image recognition [1–3], self-driving learning for end-to-end training. Adversarial
vehicles [4], semantic segmentation [5], and vehicle examples detected by the detector are passed to the
re-identiﬁcation [6]. As an essential requirement of an denoiser to remove perturbations. The detector and
intelligent transport system, remarkable performance denoiser share the same parameters in the feature
has been achieved in vehicle classiﬁcation [7, 8]. extraction stage to reduce the amount of calculation.
The main contributions of this paper are:
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applied as a pre-processing method to improve
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the robustness of vehicle classiﬁcation models;
Abstract Deep convolutional neural networks (DCNNs)
have been widely deployed in real-world scenarios.
However, DCNNs are easily tricked by adversarial
examples, which present challenges for critical applications, such as vehicle classiﬁcation. To address this
problem, we propose a novel end-to-end convolutional
network for joint detection and removal of adversarial
perturbations by denoising (DDAP). It gets rid of
adversarial perturbations using the DDAP denoiser
based on adversarial examples discovered by the DDAP
detector. The proposed method can be regarded as
a pre-processing step—it does not require modifying
the structure of the vehicle classiﬁcation model and
hardly aﬀects the classiﬁcation results on clean images.
We consider four kinds of adversarial attack (FGSM,
BIM, DeepFool, PGD) to verify DDAP’s capabilities
when trained on BIT-Vehicle and other public datasets.
It provides better defense than other state-of-the-art
defensive methods.
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Fig. 1

Generation of an adversarial example.

•

a new loss function for joint supervised training
of the adversarial perturbation detector and
denoiser, which is beneﬁcial to optimization of
the model;
• an evaluation on two vehicle datasets which
shows that our method provides state-of-the-art
performance against both white-box and blackbox attacks, with negligible reduction in classiﬁer
performance for clean images.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 reviews popular adversarial attacks and
defense methods. Our proposed approach is described
in detail in Section 3. Section 4 provides experimental
results in defending against adversarial attacks.
Finally, Section 5 concludes our work.

2

Related work

In this section, the literature on adversarial attack
methods is reviewed, and then mechanisms for
detection and defense against adversarial attacks are
introduced.
2.1

Adversarial attack methods

The concept of adversarial examples was proposed by
Szegedy et al. [19]; subsequent work [9–11] showed
that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples.
Given a classiﬁcation model f , deliberately adding
some subtle perturbations p to the correctly classiﬁed
image x, will cause f to give a wrong output yet
with high conﬁdence that f (x + p) = f (x). We
now describe some well-known adversarial attack
algorithms. It should be emphasized that we are
concerned with untargeted adversarial attacks.
Goodfellow et al. [20] introduced the attack known
as the single step fast gradient sign method (FGSM).
It keeps the amount of change consistent with the
direction of the gradient, thus inverting the output

of the classiﬁer. An adversarial example can be
expressed in the following form:
x̂ = x + ε sign(x J (x, y))

(1)

The acquisition of adversarial examples aims to
maximize the loss function J(x, y) which measures the
classiﬁcation error, usually cross-entropy. Maximizing
J causes the example no longer belong to the correct
class y after adding noise. In the optimization process,
the diﬀerence between the original example and
adversarial example needs to be within a certain
range  x̂ − x  . sign() is the sign function, acting
on the partial derivative of the loss function with
respect to x.
Extending FGSM, BIM [9] generates adversarial
examples by using FGSM multiple times with a
smaller step α. In each iteration, clip() is used to
ensure that generated perturbations stay within the
−neighborhood of the image x. clip is deﬁned as
clipx, = min {255, x + , max {0, x − , x̂}}

(2)

DeepFool [21] perturbs the image by a small
vector, and gradually pushes the image within the
classiﬁcation boundary until incorrect classiﬁcation
occurs. The adversarial example for iteration k + 1 is
|fi (xk ) − fî (xk )|
xk+1 = xk +
 fi (xk ) − fî (xk ) 22
× (fi (xk ) − fî (xk ))

(3)

where f denotes the classiﬁer model, fi (x) is the ith
dimension of the output, and fî (x) represents the
dimension with the largest output. DeepFool proves
that the generated perturbations are smaller than
those of FGSM, while achieving similar deception
rates.
Projected gradient descent (PGD) [22] can be
regarded as a similar iterative attack method to
FGSM. FGSM uses only one iteration, while PGD
performs multiple iterations, taking a small step each
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time, and each iteration’s change is clipped to a
speciﬁed range. The diﬀerence between PGD and
BIM is that the former applies random perturbations.
PGD calculates adversarial samples for iteration k + 1
using:

xk+1 =
(xk + α sign (x J (xk , y)))
(4)
x+S

2.2

Detection and defense for adversarial
examples

Diﬀerent methods have been suggested for discovering
adversarial attacks. Carrara et al. [12] utilized KNN
classiﬁcation for hidden layer activation to distinguish
correctly classiﬁed images and adversarial images.
Rakin and Fan [14] built a simple convolutional
neural network with two convolutional layers and
fully connected layers to detect adversarial examples
instead of adversarial training. Similarly, Metzen et
al. [23] attached a subnetwork to the classiﬁer model
to deal with adversarial examples. Feinman et al. [24]
veriﬁed the combination of kernel density estimates in
the subspace of the last hidden layer; Bayesian neural
network uncertainty estimates can eﬀectively discover
adversarial perturbations. Adaptive noise reduction
with scalar quantization and smoothing spatial ﬁlter
are used to detect adversarial noise in Ref. [25].
A transferability prediction diﬀerence method [13]
detects adversarial examples by measuring the
transferability diﬀerence in various DNN models.
Papernot et al. [26] considered a defensive
distillation method to resist adversarial attacks.
Results generated by the example using the original
neural network are regarded as new labels to train
a distillation network with the same architecture
and distillation temperature T , which is used for
classiﬁcation. However, Carlini and Wagner [27]
showed that defensive distillation is unable to increase
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the robustness of neural networks. Samangouei et
al. [28] borrowed a generative adversarial network
to suppress adversarial attacks on the MNIST [29]
digits dataset, but the results are hard to transfer
to other datasets. Liao et al. [15] proposed to
eliminate adversarial perturbations using high-level
features, with the output diﬀerence before softmax
as the loss function. Prakash et al. [17] developed a
technology that combines computationally eﬃcient
image transformation, redistribution of pixel values,
and soft wavelet noise reduction to overcome
perturbations. Mustafa et al. [16] considered a novel
defensive mechanism: image super-resolution enhances
the quality, and projects adversarial examples onto the
manifold of natural images.

3

Method

The framework of our proposed DDAP method
(see Fig. 2) consists of two models. The ﬁrst is an
adversarial perturbation detector and the second is
an adversarial perturbation denoiser. Both share
the same parameters for feature extraction. We now
explain the proposed defensive method in detail.
3.1

Adversarial perturbations detector

Adversarial attackers generate small perturbations
that are often imperceptible to humans, yet fool the
classiﬁer. We emphasize that adversarial images with
added perturbations change the pixel distribution and
fall outside the data manifold for real examples [14, 30].
Therefore, we can train a detection network to
determine whether an example is adversarial through
the feature representation of the input data [14, 23].
As illustrated in Fig. 3, given an input image
x ∈ R3×w×h , we deﬁne E to be a mapping function
from x to the features generated by feature extraction;

Fig. 2 Overview of our end-to-end framework. We jointly detect and remove adversarial perturbations by denoising. When the input x is
recognized as an adversarial example by the detector, Dec(x) == 1, adversarial perturbations are excluded by the denoiser model before x is
classiﬁed. Any clean image x is directly passed to the classiﬁcation model.
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Fig. 3 Architecture of the adversarial perturbation detector. Each conv unit contains a 3 × 3 convolution layer, a batch normalization layer,
and a RELU function. Each light conv unit contains a 3 × 3 depthwise convolution layer, a batch normalization layer, a RELU function and a
1 × 1 pointwise convolution layer, a batch normalization layer, and a RELU function.

Dec is a mapping function from features to the
prediction category of the detector. More speciﬁcally,
the input data is forwarded through multiple blocks
to obtain E(x). For calculation speed and to reduce
the number of parameters, normal convolution in
blocks 2 to 5 is replaced by depthwise convolution and
pointwise convolution except for the ﬁrst convolution
layer of each block [31]. Furthermore, the ﬁrst
convolutional layer in blocks 2 to 5 adapts a 2 × 2
stride for feature downsampling, making E(x) 4
times smaller than x. E(x) is then fed into three
conv units and a fully-connected layer to learn the
discriminative diﬀerence between the features of clean
images and adversarial examples. Note that the last
conv unit also utilizes 2×2 stride operations; the fullyconnected layer following softmax produces a twodimensional vector. In the inference phase, we select
the index with maximum value as the detector output.
Zero represents a clean image and one represents an
adversarial example. If the output of Dec(E(x)) is a
clean image, the original image x is delivered directly
to the target classiﬁcation model. Otherwise, the
feature representation E(x) is passed to the denoiser
to eliminate the adversarial perturbations.
3.2

Adversarial perturbation denoiser

If the detector classiﬁes the input x as an adversarial
sample, the denoiser employs the features E(x) to
reconstruct the sample, to deal with the perturbations.
The reconstruction function Den has limitations; the
goal is for the reconstructed sample to be as similar as
possible to the original data: Den(E(x)) ≈ x. In fact,
the combination of feature extraction and the denoiser
can be considered as a variant of an autoencoder,

where the feature extractor is responsible for encoding
the feature and the denoiser reconstructs the clean
features. Previous literature [30, 32] show that
adversarial examples usually lie outside the data
manifold, and the autoencoder can place them on
the manifold by learning the manifold structure.
Thus, the feature extractor and denoiser can defend
against adversarial examples attacks by removing
perturbations.
Figure 4 details the denoising process. The
feature extraction parameters are reused; the denoiser
comprises four blocks and a 1 × 1 convolutional
layer. To reduce loss of spatial information caused by
downsampling, skip-connections [5] are introduced,
and the feature maps recovered by upsampling
contain additional low-level feature information
provided by a fusion unit. This performs upsampling
and a concatenation operation. The output of
each denoiser block is upsampled using bilinear
interpolation, and then feature concatenation is
performed with the output of the corresponding
block from feature extraction. Unlike the blocks
in feature extraction, the conv units of all blocks in
the denoiser use a stride of 1 × 1. In addition, we
follow Refs. [15, 33] to implement residual learning
instead of directly reconstructing a whole image, thus
beneﬁting deep neural network training. The residual
generated by the last 1×1 convolutional layer is added
to the input x, which is converted into a clean image.
Although the structure of our denoiser is similar to
that in Ref. [15], some obvious diﬀerences exist. Our
denoiser shares feature extraction with the detector,
and the light convolution is used. We next consider
the denoiser loss function.
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Fig. 4 Architecture of the adversarial perturbation denoiser. If the input x is an adversarial image, the denoiser aims to transform it into clean
data. The conv unit and light conv unit are the same as in Fig. 3. The fusion unit performs bilinear interpolation and feature concatenation.

3.3

Network loss function

To detect and eliminate adversarial perturbations,
our end-to-end defensive method includes a detector
and a denoiser. When training the detector, each
image belongs to only one of two categories: clean
image or adversarial image. Therefore, we use a
cross-entropy cost function to measure the diﬀerence
between prediction and expectation.
Ldec ({xi } , {yi }) =

N
1 
yi ln (Dec (E (xi )))
N i

+ (1 − yi ) ln (1 − Dec (E (xi )))
(5)
where i and N respectively represent the index and
the number of examples in a mini-batch. xi is the ith
image, and yi classiﬁes xi : if xi is an adversarial
example, yi = 1; otherwise yi = 0. Dec(E(xi ))
represents the predicted probability that xi is an
adversarial example.
The goal of training the denoiser is to make the
diﬀerence between the recovered image and the clean
image as small as possible. However, the remaining
perturbations may inﬂuence the response of the target
classiﬁcation model. To overcome this problem, we
combine pixel-level loss and high-level feature loss in
the cost function used to supervise the training stage
of the denoiser, unlike Ref. [15]. The cost function of
the denoiser is
N
1 
 Den (E (x̂i )) − xi 
Lden ({xi } , {x̂i }) =
N i

+  fl (Den (E (x̂i ))) − fl (xi ) 
(6)
where x̂i denotes the adversarial sample of xi , and
Den (E (x̂i )) is the recovered output of the denoiser.
fl denotes the response of the lth convolutional layer
from the bottom of the target classiﬁcation model

and l is set to 1. The L1 norm is used to calculate
pixel-level loss and high-level feature loss.
Based on the above analysis, the cost function of
DDAP can be formulated as
L ({xi } , {x̂i } , {yi }) = αLdec ({xi } , {yi })
+ βLden ({xi } , {x̂i })

(7)

where α, β are hyperparameters. For training
stability, alternate training is adopted. First, the
parameters for feature extraction and the denoiser are
trained using clean images and adversarial examples
until the network converges. Next, the feature
extraction parameters are frozen, and the detector is
trained until convergence. Finally, we adopt a small
learning rate to ﬁne-tune the detector and denoiser.

4

Evaluation

In this section, we validate the capabilities of the
proposed DDAP method in the presence of various
adversarial attacks, including FGSM [20], BIM [9],
DeepFool [21], and PGD [22]. Then DDAP is
compared with other advanced defense methods:
LGD [15], SR [16], PD [17], and TPD [13] using the
BIT-Vehicle dataset [34] and an online Public dataset
https://github.com/CNHNLP/public-dataset. In
addition, we also consider the performance on clean
images and visualization of feature maps.
4.1

Setup

We use pre-trained Inception-v3 [3] as the target
classiﬁer. From the BIT-Vehicle dataset, we randomly
selected 7880 images as the training set and 1970
images as the test set. For the Public dataset,
we picked 1400 images as the training set and 200
images as the test set. The learning rate was set to
0.001 for the BIT-Vehicle classiﬁer and 0.01 for the
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Public classiﬁer. Both were trained for 20 epochs
with a batch size of 32, using the SGD optimization
algorithm. The accuracy of the target classiﬁer on
the BIT-Vehicle and Public datasets was 97.1% and
98.0%, respectively.
To assess the proposed model, adversarial images
are required for training and testing. We used several
attack methods to construct these adversarial samples.
The adversarial training set was generated using
FGSM, BIM, and DeepFool, while the adversarial test
set was generated using FGSM, BIM, DeepFool, and
PGD. Adding PGD during testing aims to verify the
robustness of our method against unmet adversarial
attacks. The perturbation level of these attack
methods was set to 0.15.
4.2

Implementation details

Table 1 gives the parameters used for training our
method. Diﬀerent experimental settings are used in
diﬀerent training phases to keep the optimization
stable. While training the denoiser, hyperparameter
α is set to 0. Conversely, when training the detector,
the hyperparameter β is set to 0. SGD optimization
was applied in the experiment, and an early stop
strategy was also used in the training process. The
proposed DDAP method was implemented with the
Pytorch deep learning framework, and deployed on
an NVIDIA TESLA P100 GPU.
4.3

Experimental results

4.3.1

BIT-Vehicle dataset

The BIT-Vehicle dataset targets vehicle classiﬁcation.
It contains 9850 vehicle images with diﬀerences in
lighting, scale, vehicle color, and viewpoint. Vehicles
are divided into 6 categories: Bus, Microbus, Minivan,
Sedan, SUV, and Truck. Since generating adversarial
examples for the entire dataset is expensive, we
randomly selected 2000 correctly classiﬁed images
from the training set of the target classiﬁer as
the training set, and use each adversarial attack
method to generate adversarial examples, giving an
adversarial training set with 6000 examples. Similarly,
Table 1

Training parameters for the proposed method.
Detector

α/β
Learning rate

Denoiser

Joint training

1/0

0/1

1/1

10−4

10−2

10−8

Batch size

8

8

4

Epochs

20

100

10

the adversarial test set provides 7880 samples based
on the test set of the target classiﬁer. We used the
adversarial training set to supervise training of the
denoiser. In addition, we also selected 1000 images
from both the training set and adversarial training
set to supervise the detector. The optimized model
is compared with other advanced defense models on
the adversarial test set.
Table 2 reports the defensive performance of DDAP
on the BIT-Vehicle dataset. The classiﬁcation
accuracy of the target classiﬁer without a defensive
model is signiﬁcantly lowered, and for BIM and PGD
attacks, it drops to zero. DDAP provides better
accuracy for all kinds of attack than other defensive
methods. Although PGD is not used for training, we
still achieve 95.4% accuracy, reﬂecting the robustness
of our defense method.
We also investigated the capabilities of these defense
methods under black-box attack. In a black-box
attack setting, the attacker has no knowledge of the
target classiﬁer. Therefore, another classiﬁer ResNet18 [2] was optimized on the BIT-Vehicle training set,
and the adversarial test set was constructed using the
ResNet-18 classiﬁer and the same attack methods. As
illustrated in Table 3, even though the classiﬁcation
accuracy of DDAP decreases slightly compared with a
white-box attack, it still outperforms other methods.
Obviously, LGD is sensitive to black-box attack, and
its classiﬁcation accuracy rate drops by nearly 30%.
This may be caused by insuﬃcient ability to learn
manifold structure.
4.3.2

Public dataset

The Public dataset contains 10 vehicle categories:
Bus, Family Sedan, Fire Engine, Heavy Truck, Jeep,
Minibus, Racing Car, SUV, Taxi, and Truck. We
extracted 1400 images as the training set and 200
images as the test set. An adversarial training set
and adversarial test set were constructed as before.
Table 4 shows defensive performance of DDAP
on Public dataset. SR and PD may fail to defend
against FGSM attack because the classiﬁcation
accuracy of the target classiﬁer is only 25% and
16%. On the contrary, both LGD and DDAP achieve
acceptable defensive eﬀect, and DDAP gets higher
accuracy compared with LGD. DDAP supports the
target classiﬁer to obtain 96.0% accuracy under PGD
attack, conﬁrming the robustness of the proposed
method under diﬀerent attackers. It should be
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Table 2

Classiﬁcation accuracy on the BIT-Vehicle dataset obtained by diﬀerent defensive methods
No defense

LGD [15]

SR [16]

PD [17]

DDAP

FGSM [20]

58.7%

88.8%

59.3%

58.8%

96.4%

BIM [9]

0.0%

92.2%

65.2%

74.4%

95.5%

DeepFool [21]

23.0%

95.1%

95.4%

94.1%

96.6%

PGD [22]

0.0%

92.2%

74.8%

76.0%

95.4%

Table 3
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Classiﬁcation accuracy on the BIT-Vehicle dataset for diﬀerent defensive methods, under black-box attack
No defense

LGD [15]

FGSM [20]

58.8%

BIM [9]

70.8%

DeepFool [21]
PGD [22]

Table 4

FGSM [20]

SR [16]

PD [17]

DDAP

59.0%

58.9%

58.8%

82.1%

60.3%

71.7%

73.9%

88.0%

95.4%

64.3%

95.1%

93.4%

97.1%

68.7%

60.1%

69.9%

71.3%

88.1%

Classiﬁcation accuracy using diﬀerent defensive methods and the Public dataset
No defense

LGD [15]

SR [16]

PD [17]

DDAP

4.0%

92.0%

25.0%

16.0%

97.5%

BIM [9]

0.0%

94.5%

66.0%

73.5%

98.0%

DeepFool [21]

8.0%

97.5%

97.5%

96.5%

98.0%

PGD [22]

0.0%

94.5%

70.5%

68.0%

96.0%

pointed out that compared with other attackers,
DeepFool’s eﬀect on defensive models is limited, and
the accuracy of the target classiﬁer slightly decreases.
Table 5 compares average forward time of these
defensive methods, and DDAP spends less inference
time due to lightweight convolution and parameter
sharing of the feature extraction. Figure 5 exhibits

Fig. 5

Table 5 Average inference time on test images for diﬀerent defense
methods
LGD [15]

SR [16]

PD [17]

DDAP

0.066 s

0.50 s

0.515 s

0.056 s

some examples of defensive. The target classiﬁcation
is mispredicted by adversarial images, which is added

Selected examples produced by DDAP. Labels below each image indicate the output classiﬁcation.
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with imperceptible perturbations. After removing
perturbations, there is almost no diﬀerence between
defended images and clean images, which enhances
the correct prediction of the target classiﬁer.
As the ﬁrst step of the network, it is critical that
the detector correctly detects adversarial examples.
We compare our method with TPD for recognition
accuracy on the Public adversarial test set. In
TPD, we assume trained Inception-v3, and Resnet-18
with softmax normalization, as defensive model and
target model. Table 6 summarizes the recognition
performance of TPD and DDAP. In order to balance
classiﬁcation accuracy of TPD for both clean and
adversarial examples, thresholds of 0.05 and 0.1 were
considered. The recognition accuracy achieved by
TDP is 73.9% and 71.2% for these diﬀerent thresholds,
which is far short of the 99.1% achieved by DDAP.
4.3.3

Performance on clean images

As mentioned in the introduction, using defensive
models may reduce the accuracy of the target classiﬁer
when presented with clean images. Table 7 provides
target classiﬁer results for various defensive methods
on the BIT-Vehicle and Public test sets. Using LGD
greatly reduces the classiﬁcation accuracy from 79.5%
to 65.4%. DDAP hardly aﬀects the performance of
the classiﬁer on clean images, reducing it to 97.1%
from 97.5%. This is also better than the results
obtained by SR and PD.
4.3.4

Ablation study for DDAP

In order to verify the eﬀectiveness of the design, we
compared the performance of DDAP with or without
Table 6 Accuracy of recognition of adversarial examples from the
Public dataset
TPD [13] (t=0.05)

TPD (t=0.1)

DDAP

73.9%

71.2%

99.1%

Table 7 Classiﬁcation accuracy of clean images using diﬀerent
defense methods
No defense LGD [15] SR [16] PD [17] DDAP
BIT-Vehicle [34]

97.1%

65.4%

95.5%

94.4%

97.1%

Public dataset

98.0%

79.5%

96.0%

95.5%

97.5%

Table 8 Classiﬁcation performance of DDAP with and without the
detector, for two datasets

the detector on two vehicle datasets. The test set
includes clean images and the adversarial test set.
Table 8 shows that DDAP with the detector achieves
better classiﬁcation accuracy than without, indicating
the beneﬁt of adding the detector.
4.3.5

DUNET

If we remove the detector from DDAP, it basically
degenerates to DUNET [15]. Ideally, if we combine
clean examples and adversarial examples to train
DUNET, it may learn the ability to recognizing
clean images and adversarial examples, and denoise
adversarial perturbations at the same time. When a
clean example is entered, it outputs the original clean
example. When an adversarial example is input, a
repaired example is output. Therefore, we combined
the adversarial training set and the training set to
form a joint training set, using BIT-Vehicle. The
test set and adversarial samples generated by attack
methods were employed to construct the joint test
set. The joint training set was used to train both
DDAP and DUNET. Table 9 gives the classiﬁcation
accuracy on the joint test set. DDAP achieves better
results than DUNET for all kinds of attack, which
may be due to it being diﬃcult for DUNET to learn
to recognize and reduce perturbations at the same
time.
4.3.6

Further validation on the CompCars dataset

In order to further validate the eﬀectiveness of the
design, various defense methods were also tested in
the web-nature scenario of the CompCars dataset
[35], which includes MPV, SUV, Sedan, Hatchback,
Minibus, Fastback, Estate, Pickup, Hardtop
Convertible, Sports, Crossover, Convertible. Since
it is very expensive to generate adversarial samples
for the entire dataset, we randomly constructed 8640
adversarial training set examples and 2880 adversarial
test set examples. Table 10 gives the results. As
before, these methods eﬀectively defend against
DeepFool. DDAP achieves the best classiﬁcation
accuracy for all attacks.
Table 9
Vehicle

Classiﬁcation accuracy comparison with DUNET on BIT-

DDAP without detector

DDAP

FGSM [20]

BIM [9]

BIT-Vehicle [34]

92.3%

96.2%

DUNET [15]

87.1%

86.6%

DeepFool [21]
87.2%

Public dataset

88.1%

97.1%

DDAP

96.7%

96.3%

96.6%

An end-to-end convolutional network for joint detecting and denoising adversarial perturbations in vehicle classification
Table 10 Classiﬁcation accuracy for diﬀerent defensive methods
using the CompCars dataset
No defensive LGD [15] SR [16] PD [17] DDAP
FGSM [20]

75.4%

97.5%

66.0%

68.1%

99.7%

BIM [9]

21.4%

98.3%

21.9%

22.2%

99.4%

DeepFool [21]

2.4%

99.9%

99.4%

99.4%

99.9%

PGD [22]

13.9%

98.2%

14.6%

14.7%

99.7%

4.3.7

CAMs visualization

CAMs [36] is a method to help interpret convolutional
neural networks: it can visualize the discriminative
features they learn. Usually, redder regions are more
sensitive to the target classiﬁer. Figure 6 shows the
class activation mapping for the top-1 prediction of
the Inception-v3 classiﬁer on the BIT-Vehicle data.
The target classiﬁer focuses on the vehicle region in
clean images. The perturbations generated by FGSM
take attention from these discriminative features,
resulting in incorrect classiﬁcation. We can see that
DDAP can refocus on the discriminative region by
removing the perturbations.

5
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Conclusions

In this paper, we have presented an end-to-end
approach, DDAP, to defend against adversarial
attacks in vehicle classiﬁcation. It detects adversarial
examples and eliminates adversarial perturbations
without changing the structure of the vehicle classiﬁer.
As our experiments demonstrate, DDAP resists a
variety of powerful adversarial attacks and is robust
in both white-box and black-box attacks. The DDAP
model only slightly decreases the performance of the
vehicle classiﬁer on clean images, and outperforms
other state-of-the-art defensive methods on available
vehicle datasets.
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